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Abstract
When choosing policy mechanisms to design and deploy energy
policies, policymakers typically seek cost-effective ones, linking costeffectiveness to the lowest cost of support for RES-E generation and/or
consumer costs. The objectives of this paper are to analyze the costeffectiveness of renewable portfolio standards (RPS), feed-in tariffs
(FIT) and auctions in the short and long term, considering both
technology-neutral and technology-specific approaches. Results show
that RPS and auctions are more cost-effective than feed-in tariffs (FIT)
in the short term if cost-effectiveness is defined as minimizing consumer costs. Also, if one or more emerging technologies with higher
levelized life cycle costs (LCC), low cumulative production and high
experience elasticity are considered in the pool of RES-E policy design,
a technology-neutral approach in the short-term could lock out these
emerging technologies, avoiding a long term LCC reduction. In this
case, a technology-specific policy used in the short-term would reflect
lower total generation policy costs in the long term if compared with a
technology-neutral policy in both short and long term. This paper calls
this phenomenon the paradox of technology-neutral and technologyspecific policies in the long term. Considering the results, this paper
suggests a mix of technology-neutral and technology-specific policies
using RPS or auction mechanisms to promote RES-E.
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1

Introduction

Policy and incentives are responsible for cost reduction of renewable energy technologies (Chowdhury et al., 2014). Policymakers have used various policy mechanisms to promote clean energy technologies worldwide in
recent years, considering both technology-neutral and technology-specific
approaches. Renewable portfolio standards (RPS), feed-in tariffs (FIT) and
auctions are examples of recently used policy mechanisms that can have
a technology-neutral or technology-specific approach, and policymakers
usually seek cost-effective policy mechanisms to design and deploy these
policies. Cost-effectiveness is usually associated with the lowest cost of
support for minimizing RES-E generation and consumer costs, which can
be the same or different depending on the chosen energy policy mechanism. This paper explains this assumption and clarifies the differences
among FIT, RPS and auction cost-effectiveness using technology-neutral
and technology-specific approaches in both short and long term.
In this paper, short term is defined as a period in which RES-E LCC
doesn’t change; in other words, there is no experience elasticity or other effects involved that could affect LCC. In the long term, experience elasticity
could reduce LCC, and this is explained by the experience curve in Section
3 of this paper. Another assumption of this work is that all resources would
be allocated efficiently in all policy mechanisms studied.
Cost-effectiveness as the minimization of generation costs means the total generation costs for the quantity of energy (electricity or fuel) contracted
reflect the minimum LCC possible for the RES-E considered for a given
policy mechanism. It also means that the total policy cost is equal to the
minimization of generation costs. While this may be particularly true in an
efficient RPS and auction, this paper will explain how it is not the case for
FIT.
Extensive literature exists for analyzing and comparing the costeffectiveness of energy policy mechanisms, such as FIT, REP and auctions,
including IEA (2011); Verbruggen and Lauber (2012); Schmalensee (2012);
Haas et al. (2011); Mäkelä et al. (2011); Sandeman (2010); Kylili and Fokaides
(2015); Rego and Parente (2013); Mastropietro et al. (2014); Nielsen et al.
(2011); Sun and yan Nie (2015); Schelly (2014); Eastin (2014), and Wang
et al. (2014).
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These studies often analyze and compare the cost-effectiveness of RPS,
FIT and auctions based on case studies or modeling, but none compare
these policies based on their conceptual framework in both short and long
term using both technology-neutral and technology-specific approaches.
Studies that relate the long-term cost-effectiveness impacts of an energy
policy based on a formerly used short-term energy policy are nonexistent.
The objectives of this paper are first to analyze the cost-effectiveness
of RPS, FIT and auctions in the short term, considering both technologyneutral and technology-specific approaches. Second it analyses the effects
of technology-neutral and technology-specific cost-effectiveness for RES-E
in the long term considering the policy mechanisms used in the short term.
Section 2 describes FIT, RPS and auctions as energy policy mechanisms
recently used worldwide and also reviews the main findings regarding
their cost-effectiveness in literature. Section 3 explains the concepts of levelized life cycle costs (LCC) and experience curves, which describes how an
emerging RES-E LCC may reduce in the long term because of the increase
in cumulative production and the experience elasticity. Section 4 details
the cost-effectiveness of technology-neutral and technology-specific RPS,
FIT and auction policies in both short and long terms, illustrating a likely
paradox of technology-neutral and technology-specific policies in the long
term. Section 5 addresses the conclusions of this paper.

2

FIT, RPS and auctions as energy policy mechanisms

A main finding of the RES-E support literature is that the success of support
schemes depends as much on the instruments chosen as on their design elements (del Río and Cerdá, 2014). Feed-in tariffs and renewable portfolio
standards can effectively increase the share of renewable energy power and
lead to renewable resource diversity (Wang et al., 2014), although it does so
with different total costs for consumers. Auctions reflect a positive reform
to ensure adequacy through promoting investment and mitigating risks
and market power (Moreno et al., 2010), which is similar in some aspects to
RPS as described in Section 4.
Renewable portfolio standards (RPS), feed-in tariffs (FIT) and auctions
are examples of policy mechanisms recently used by policymakers around
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the world to promote RES-E, and they can have a technology-neutral or
technology-specific approach. This section briefly explains how these mechanisms work, their main differences, and how the literature regards their
cost-effectiveness.
Feed-in tariffs are subsidies per MWh generated and producers of renewable electricity are paid either in the form of guaranteed fixed prices
or in premium prices combined with a purchase obligation by the utilities.
These programs, often called feed-in tariffs, are more common in Europe
than in the United States (Jenner et al., 2013) and are used more for electricity. It is possible, however, to design it for use with fuels based on GJ
instead of MWh.
FIT can have a technology-neutral or a technology-specific approach. In
a technology-neutral approach, also called flat tariff, a uniform tariff is provided for all technologies in a given region, for example, in US$/MWh. This
approach ignores generation costs, leaving it to investors to decide which
allowed renewable technology to pick. In a technology-specific approach,
a tariff is fixed for a particular technology; and despite some variations
from one country to another, the concept of FIT is guaranteed premium
prices combined with a purchase obligation by the utilities. Several studies, including Schallenberg-Rodriguez and Haas (2012); Lin et al. (2014);
Huenteler (2014); Wong et al. (2015); Buckman et al. (2014); Schmidt et al.
(2013); Muhammad-Sukki et al. (2014); Valentine (2010), and Chowdhury
et al. (2014) have analyzed different aspects of FIT programs. They all agree
that the results are good for FIT in terms of RES-E deployment and for promoting RES-E. However, FIT guarantees the purchase of renewable energy
regardless of cost, usually providing extra-profit to producers, as explained
in Section 4.
Renewable portfolio standard (RPS) is a policy mechanism implemented
throughout much of the United States. RPS mandates a relative or absolute
quantity of electricity (% or MWh in some states) be generated from renewable sources. This encourages price competition between different types
of renewable energy. Technology-neutral approaches promote competition
through RES-E eligibility, allowing the market to identify the winning technology. In a technology-specific approach, a specific RES-E may be chosen
to be promoted, and it typically operates through Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs), which determine prices by conditions of the market’s supply
and demand. This approach is different from FIT, whose prices are prede-
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termined by policymakers. Some US states use multiple methods to meet
the RPS requirement; for example, self-generation, procuring power from
renewable sources via bilateral contracts and purchasing the renewable energy certificates/credits (RECs) from secondary markets (Tanaka and Chen,
2013). The literature includes studies that analyze the cost-effectiveness of
RPS, including Kung (2012); Stockmayer et al. (2012); Schelly (2014); Farooq
et al. (2013); Daim and Cowan (2010), and Aslani and Wong (2014). State
RPSs vary widely in their attempt to control or limit RPS costs but producers’ profits are less than market average (Stockmayer et al., 2012). In
general, these studies agree that RPS help to promote RES-E.
Recently, auctions have become popular in attracting public utility investors. After the 1990s, there were bidding processes in several countries
around the world; and it became apparent that auctions were frequently
used in electricity markets that required restructuring. Rego and Parente
(2013).
In a technology-neutral auction, RES-E compete against each other
(Moreno et al., 2010; Rego, 2013), so one or more technologies may not
be contracted if there is too much disparity in LCC. Technology-specific
auctions may be done conducting separate auctions, as used to contract
photovoltaics in Cyprus (Kylili and Fokaides, 2015). Auctions to purchase
long-term contracts were used in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and New
England (US) in recent years, and they proved successful in promoting
investment while mitigating risks and market power (Moreno et al., 2010).
Despite the risk of collusion, which can be mitigated as shown in
(Moreno et al., 2010; Rego, 2013), auctioning RES-E with long-term contracts are an effective tool to promote generation investment and achieve
the desired RES-E target.

3

Levelized life cycle costs (LCC) and experience curves
for RES-E

The level of support a technology needs to be competitive and the percentage of this support that should be derived from government budgets
are crucial questions. Experience curves make it possible to answer such
questions because they provide a simple, quantitative relationship between
LCC and the cumulative production or use of a technology (IEA, 2003).
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Literature shows that policy and incentives are responsible for cost reduction (Chowdhury et al., 2014). Also, unaligned energy policy and termination of incentives may cause energy markets to decline, locking out some
promising energy technologies. A comparative study between Japan and
Germany shows that government incentives kept Japan in the top position
for years. Once Japan reduced its government support, Japan’s success
declined and Germany’s success increased in the PV industry because of
government support (Chowdhury et al., 2014). This is because some technologies need policy support to reduce their costs when transitioning from
the demonstration stage to the commercial deployment stage where LCC is
higher in the short term (Sun and yan Nie, 2015).
Levelized life cycle cost (LCC) is a tool for comparing unit costs of different technologies over their economic life. The calculation of the LCC is
based on the equivalence of the present value of the sum of discounted revenues and the present value of the sum of discounted costs (IEA, 2010). It’s
basically the equivalent annual value of energy cost in a considered useful
life in a given interest rate. LCC unit may be given in US$/gallon, US$/liter,
US$/MWh or any other commercial currency and measurement depending
on the currency and energy being considered. In the case of electricity, LCC
for RES-E is usually given in US$/MWh. LCC may then be compared with
market price to check if the net present value is positive in a given discount
rate. The discount rate chosen is usually subjective because it depends on
the investor’s opportunity costs and risk evaluation. A usual manner to
address this factor is to decide if the rate of return on the money needed for
the project could be a higher return if invested in an alternative investment.
LCC may change in the long term, especially for emerging technologies. Some energy policy mechanisms may accelerate this reduction to help
bring technologies to market. Experience curve is a trend which relates LCC
changes to cumulative sales. The mathematical expression which describes
the one factor experience curve is shown in Equation (1).
LCCx,t = P0 × C−ε
x,t

(1)

Equation 1: Levelized life cycle cost (LCC) equation. Source: adapted from
(IEA, 2000)
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The different variables indicate:
• LCCx,t = Life cycle cost of unit production (USD/W, or EUR/GJ for
example);
• P0 = normalized price, normally for 1 unit of cumulative sales;
• Cx,t = cumulative power (e.g. MW), production or sales (e.g. MWh,
GJ) in year “t”;
• ε = experience elasticity (experience parameter);
• x = technology;
• t = period.
The parameter ε is the experience parameter, which characterizes the
inclination of the curve (IEA, 2000). Large values of ε indicate a steep curve
with a high learning rate. One important concept of the experience curve
is the progress ratio “PR”, which is the corresponding change in price level
after a doubling of cumulative sales.

PR =

P0 × (2Cx,t )−ε
= 2−ε
P0 × C−ε
x,t

(2)

Equation 2: Progress ratio “PR” of RES-E after a doubling of cumulative
sales
For example, if ε = 20%, it means that LCC with the same interest rate
decreases 20% when cumulative sales double. The learning rate (LR) in
this case would be 80%, which is represented by (1 − ε). Learning rates for
photovoltaics, wind, bioenergy and others in different countries are found
in the literature (Ibenholt, 2002; Ferioli et al., 2009; IEA, 2003, 2000; Nemet,
2006; Yu et al., 2011; Weiss et al., 2010; Junginger et al., 2010).
Photovoltaics is a good case study to illustrate this phenomenon. The
PV module historical learning experience (ε) ranges between 11% and 26%
worldwide (Edenhofer et al., 2011). In Germany, for example, the learning
rate has been observed to be approximately 20% on average between 1980
and 2011 (for Solar Energy Systems", 2012).
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In many cases, “learning-by doing” may improve the overall costs or efficiency of a technology, but the effects of single component improvements
that together may explain an aggregated form of learning also should be
considered (Ferioli et al., 2009). Indeed, for an entire technology the phenomenon of learning-by-doing may well result from only learning one or
a few individual components (Ferioli et al., 2009). For example, the price
of silicon for photovoltaics and energy efficiency improvements of panels
may explain cost reductions better than the entire photovoltaic system.
The next section illustrates how LCC and experience curves might affect technology-neutral and technology-specific FIT, RPS and auctions in
the short and long term. Moreover, a phenomenon called paradox of
technology-neutral and technology-specific policies could occur in the long
term, depending on LCC and elasticity parameters of RES-E being used.

4

Cost effectiveness of technology-neutral and
technology-specific RPS, FIT and auction
policies

Cost effectiveness of technology-neutral and technology-specific RPS, FIT
and auction policies
RES-E technology costs have basically three components in the levelized
life cycle cost (LCC); they are initial investments, fixed and variable costs.
In some energy technologies, such as grid connected wind, hydro or photovoltaics, the LCC costs tend to increase in a static perspective based on
the equimarginality principle. The equimarginality principle states that the
cheapest technologies with the lowest RES-E generation costs should be
used first (del Río and Cerdá, 2014) and more expensive technologies with
higher RES-E generation costs should be used last, although the latter might
still be needed to meet the RES-E target. Because of this effect, marginal
LCC from each plant tends to be positive, (del Río and Cerdá, 2014). In
this paper, these marginal generation costs are considered infinitesimal to
describe the analysis taken, so that LCC are drawn as ascending curves.

4.1

Short-term policies

Let’s suppose that a technology-neutral FIT policy (FIT-N) is chosen for
RES-E in a given region. LCCa , LCCb , LCCc , LCCd are the LCC curves
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for technologies “a”, “b”, “c” and “d”, respectively. We can assume that
those technologies in this given region would be photovoltaics (a), wind (b),
biomass (c) and small scale hydro (d).
Let’s consider a FIT −N policy in its optimal LCC level (LCCFIT−N ) where
the quantity of energy contracted qFIT−N = (qb + qc + qd ) hits the LCC curves
at the LCCFIT−N . qb ,qc and qd are the quantity of technologies “b”, “c” and
“d” contracted. At LCCFIT−N level, technology “a” would not be contracted,
as can be seen in Figure 1.
This would be a cost-effective policy in terms of minimization of generation costs considering total generation cost TGC(qFIT−N ) as Equation (3),
which is the sum of the areas below the LCCb , LCCc and LCCd curves.

qb

Z
TGCFIT−N =
0

qc

Z
LCCb (q)dq +
0

qd

Z
LCCc (q)dq +

LCCd (q)dq

(3)

0

Equation 3: Total generation costs of a FIT-N policy at LCCFIT-N level.
Figure 1 shows that the total technology-neutral FIT policy costs, which
is TPCFIT−N = (qb + qc + qd ) × LCCFIT−N , is less than TGCFIT−N , as shown in
Equation (4).
TPCFIT−N = (qb + qc + qd ) × LCCFIT−N < TGC(qFIT−N )

(4)

Equation 4: Comparison of FIT-N total policy costs (TPCFIT−N ) and total
generation costs TGCFIT−N
Since LCC methodology already considers the discount factor, producer
extra-profit (PEP) for this technology-neutral FIT (PEPFIT−N ) would be similar to equation (5), which is TPCFIT−N less TGC(qFIT−N ).
PEPFIT−N = TPCFIT−N − TGC(qFIT−N ).
Equation 5: Producer extra-profit (PEP) in a FIT-N policy.

(5)
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As producers capture all extra-profit in this type of policy, it can be inferred that a technology-neutral FIT policy is not cost-effective in terms of
minimizing consumer costs. It is effective, however, for minimizing generation costs, but the extra-profit that is captured by producers makes this
policy too costly for consumers.

Figure 1: LCC curves for RES-E technologies “a”, “b”, “c” and “d” and
their quantities contracted in a FIT-N policy.
Let’s consider that a technology-specific, feed-in tariff policy (FIT-S)
would be chosen instead of a technology-neutral, including technology “a”,
where the quantity of energy contracted (qFIT−S ) qFIT−S = (qa + q0b + q0c + q0d ),
where qa , q0b , q0c , q0d are the quantity of technologies “a”, “b”, “c” and
“d”. Furthermore, we consider that qFIT−S = qFIT−N , or (qa + q0 b + q0 c + q0 d) =
(qb+qc+qd) if we write in terms of quantity. LCCFIT−Sa , LCCFIT−Sb , LCCFIT−Sc ,
and LCCFIT−Sd are the LCCs of this technology specific FIT for technologies
“a”, “b”, “c”, and “d” respectively. Total generation cost of this technologyspecific FIT policy TGCFIT−S in this case would be similar to Equation (6),
which is the sum of the areas below the LCCFIT−Sa , LCCFIT−Sb , LCCFIT−Sc ,
and LCCFIT−Sd curves of Figure 2.
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TGCFIT−N =
Z qa
Z
LCCa (q)dq +
0

(6)
q0b

q0c

Z
LCCb (q)dq +

0

q0d

Z
LCCc (q)dq +

0

LCCd (q)dq

0

Equation 6: Total generation costs of a FIT-S policy at LCCFIT−Sa , LCCFIT−Sb ,
LCCFIT−Sc , and LCCFIT−Sd levels.
This situation can be seen in figure 2. It’s possible to see that total
technology-specific FIT policy costs (TPCFIT−S ) is less than TGCFIT−S , as
shown in equation (7) (it can also clearly be seen in Figure 2).

(qa ∗ LCCFIT−Sa + q0b ∗ LCCFIT−Sb + q0c ∗ LCCFIT−Sc + q0d ∗ LCCFIT−Sd )
= TPCFIT−S > TGCFIT−S

(7)

Equation 7: Comparison of FIT-S total policy costs (TPCFIT−S ) and its total
generation costs TGCFIT−S
As qFIT−S = qFIT−N and technology-neutral FIT policy is cost-effective
in terms of minimization of generation costs, it can be inferred that total technology-specific FIT policy costs (TPCFIT−S ) is greater than total
technology-neutral FIT policy costs (TPCFIT−N ), (TGCFIT−S > TGCFIT−N ),
because it included technology “a”, whose costs are higher than the other
technologies until the policy reaches qFIT−S = qFIT−N . This is obvious, since
government enforced a more expensive technology to be part of the RES-E
policy portfolio. Also, a technology-specific FIT policy in this situation is
non cost-effective in terms of minimization of consumer costs, because the
extra-profit is also captured by the producer. The producer extra-profit for
this technology-specific FIT (PEPFIT−S ) would be like Equation (8).
PEPFIT−S = TPCFIT−S − TGC(qFIT−S ).

(8)

Equation 8: Producer extra-profit (PEP) in a FIT-N policy.
As investors also capture all extra-profit in this type of policy, it can be
inferred that a technology-specific feed-in tariff policy is non cost-effective
in terms of minimization of consumer costs either.
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Figure 2: LCC curves for RES-E technologies “a”, “b”, “c” and “d” and their
quantities contracted in a FIT-S policy.
Figure 2: In the short term, we can conclude that a technology-neutral
FIT policy is cost-effective in terms of minimization of generation costs but
not in terms of minimization of consumer costs because all profit is captured
by producers in the short-term. Also in the short-term, a technology-specific
feed-in tariff policy is not cost-effective in terms of minimization of producer
and consumer costs.
Considering a renewable portfolio policy (RPS), producers in this case
want to assess whether they will be able to get their money back and make
profit. Instead of setting up a tariff, RPS sets up a target quantity in relative
or absolute terms.
Let’s consider the same example used in FIT with the same four technologies and LCC curves. In this RPS case, let’s consider that all investors
would sell energy with the same internal rate of return (IRR) already considered in the LCC curves.

First, let’s suppose a RPS technology-neutral policy whose target is
qRPS−N . Let’s also consider that in this case qRPS−N = qFIT−S = qFIT−N =
(qb + qc + qd ) and the total generation costs of FIT (TGCFIT−N ) would be the
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same as the total generation costs of a RPS technology-neutral (TGCRPS−N ).
Considering perfect competition, market would allocate the resources efficiently, so that the total technology-neutral RPS policy costs (TPCRPS−N )
would be equal to total generation costs TGCRPS−N in the short-term. It
would not generate extra-profit because all RES-E contracted would be exactly in the LCC curve. Equation (9) describes the situation (please see
figure 1 for LCC curves).

TPCRPS−N =

(9)
qb

Z
TGCRPS−N =

qc

Z
LCCb (q)dq +

0

qd

Z
LCCc (q)dq +

0

LCCd (q)dq
0

Equation 9: Total generation costs of a RPS-N policy at considering perfect allocation of RES-E.
Let’s now consider a RPS technology-specific policy target of qRPS−S
where qRPS−S = qRPS−N = qFIT−S = qFIT−N . If we consider also that qRPS−S =
(qa + q0b + q0c + q0d ) and that market will allocate the resources efficiently,
technology-specific RPS total policy costs (TPCRPS−S ) would be equal to
total generation costs (TGCRPS−S ) in the short-term, like equation (10), also
with no extra-profit for producers.

qa

Z
S
0

q0b

Z
LCCa (q)dq +
0

Z
LCCb (q)dq +
0

q0c

TPCRPS−N = TGCRPS−N = (10)
Z q0
d
LCCc (q)dq +
LCCd (q)dq
0

Equation 10: Total generation costs of a RPS-S policy at considering
perfect allocation of RES-E.

It can be inferred that TPCRPS−S > TPCRPS−N in the short-term because
in the technology-specific RPS technology “a” was enforced, even with a
higher LCC.
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It can be concluded that a technology-neutral RPS is cost-effective in
both terms of minimization of generation costs and minimization of consumer costs in the short term. Also in the short-term, a technology-specific
RPS is not cost-effective in terms of minimization of producer and consumer
costs.
In this paper, auctions are considered similar to RPS policies in terms
of cost-effectiveness. The only difference is that in RPS the market reaches
the desired quantity though market interactions among buyers and sellers.
In auctions, policymakers coordinate purchasing energy in long-term contracts, normally starting with the lower LCC until it reaches the desired
quantity. The results can be considered similar because RPS, and auctions
attempts to allocate market supply and demand efficiently.
If we think that “n” technologies would be contracted in a technologyneutral approach in any policy mechanism at the level qpolicy and that “m”
entrant technologies would not, it’s possible to extrapolate this to create a
general case. So, when we think in the short-term, a cost-effective policy for
RES-E in terms of minimization of generation and consumer costs would
be a technology-neutral RPS or auction policy. However, in the long term
things may change, as illustrated in sub-section 4.2.

4.2

Long-term policies

Experience curves showed that LCC costs may decrease with cumulative
capacity, so it should also be considered when we think in the long term.
Let’s, then, consider the impact of one short-term policy mechanism with
another long-term policy.
First of all, large values of the experience parameter “ε” indicate a
steep curve with a high learning rate. In this example, we consider that
εa  εb ≈ εc ≈ εd , where εa , εb , εc , and εd are the experience parameter of technologies “a”, “b”, “c” and “d”, respectively. Let’s consider that
εb ≈ εc ≈ εd is approximately zero and that cumulative production didn’t
increase significantly for these three technologies. It means that the LCC
cost curves would not change for those technologies in the given region,
reflecting the same cost curves as shown in Figures 1 and 2. Also, “a” is an
emerging energy technology with low cumulative production and a high
experience elasticity (εa ) value, enough to bring it to market if a technologyspecific policy promoted technology “a” in the short term.
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Now we’ll consider a long-term policy, but one that is conditioned by
the past chosen policy. If we chose a technology-neutral policy in the past
(FIT, RPS or auction), qRPS−N = qFIT−N = (qb + qc + qd ), technology “a” would
not be contracted. If we used this policy in the short term, LCC would not
change in the long term for this technology. So, if we consider the minimization of generation and generation costs, a technology-neutral policy
in the short-term would lead to another technology-neutral policy in the
long term, with total generation costs in the long term (TGCL ) being the
same as total generation costs in the short term, for FIT, RPS or auction
(TGCL = TGCFIT−S = TGCFIT−N ).
Let’s consider now a technology-specific policy in the short-term with
the same LCC costs as Figure 3. LCCLa , LCCLb , LCCLc , LCCLd are the levelized
life cycle cost in the long term for technologies “a”, “b”, “c” and “d”, respectively. If we chose a technology-specific FIT, RPS or auction in the past,
qRPS−S = qFIT−S = (qa + q0b + q0c + q0d ), technology “a” would be contracted at
that time. Let’s suppose that LCC costs of technology “a” would decrease
from LCCa to LCCLa due to experience curve concept, as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: LCC curves for RES-E technologies “a”, “b”, “c” and “d” in the
long term considering a technology-specific policy in the past.
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In this situation with a technology-specific approach in the short-term, if
the same amount of energy qRPS−S = qFIT−S = (qa + q0b + q0c + q0d ) = (qb + qc + qd )
is contracted through a technology-neutral policy in the long term (FIT, RPS
or auction), it’s possible to say that total generation costs in the long term
(TGCL ) is lower than total generation costs in the short term (TGCS ), so
TGCL < TGCS .
If we think in a FIT policy mechanism, this effect is easily shown
because for the same quantity contracted for a technology-neutral FIT
in the short-term, LCCFIT−N would be lower because another technology
with a lower LCC cost (technology “a” in this case) entered the market.
LCCLFIT−N is the LCC of a FIT technology-neutral policy in the long term,
so LCCFIT−N < LCCFIT−N . As described before, LCCLb , LCCLc , LCCLd ≈ LCCb ,
LCCc , LCCd . For the same quantity in the long term (qLT ), the quantity contracted for technology “a”, “b”, “c” and “d” are respectively qLa , qLb , qLc , qLd .
So, qLT = qRPS−S = qFIT−S = (qLa + qLb + qLc + qLd ) = (qa + q0b + q0c + q0d ) = (qb + qc + qd )
and total cost of this long term policy would be like equations (11) and (12),
which are illustrated in Figure 4.

TGCL =
Z qLa
Z
L
LCCa (q)dq +
0

(11)
q0L
b
0

q0L
c

Z
LCCLb (q)dq +

0

q0L
d

Z
LCCLc (q)dq +

0

LCCLd (q)dq

Equation 11: Total generation costs in the long term for a FIT-N policy,
considering a technology-specific policy in the past.
TGCL < TGCRPS−S = TGCFIT−S

(12)

Equation 12: Comparison of total generation costs in the short and long
term.
Table 1 shows the main results for total generation costs in the short and
long term, illustrating that a cost-effective decision in the short term may
lock out emerging RES-E in the long term, leading to a higher TGC than
if a technology-specific approach were used in the short term. I call this
phenomenon the paradox of technology-neutral and technology-specific
policies in the short and long term.
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Figure 4: LCC curves, LCCFIT-N in the short-term and LCCLFIT-N in
the long term for RES-E technologies “a”, “b”, “c” and “d” considering a
technology-specific policy in the past.
Table 1: Paradox of technology-neutral and technology-specific policies in
the short and long term
SHORT TERM POLICY

Technologyneutral

TGCN < TGCS

Technologyspecific

TGCN < TGCS

5

LONG TERM POLICY, CONSIDERING THE SHORT TERM POLICY
TAKEN BEFORE
TechnologyTGCLN = TGCN
neutral
TechnologyTGCLS > TGCN
specific
TechnologyTGCLN < TGCN < TGCS
neutral

Conclusions

This paper illustrates the relationship between FIT, RPS and auction policy
mechanisms and cost-effectiveness in terms of minimization of generation
and consumer costs. The minimization of generation costs would lead
to the minimization of consumer costs only if extra-profit were not captured by RES-E producers, which would occur if the RPS or auction policy
were chosen. In the case of FIT policy, producers capture the extra-profit.
It also shows that technology-neutral and technology-specific approaches
may have different impacts in the short and long term, causing a phenomenon that we call the paradox of technology-neutral and technology-
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specific policies in the short and long term. This paradox could occur
because a cost-effective technology-neutral policy in the short term could
lock out emerging energy technologies in the long term and lead to a higher
TGC in the future than if a technology-specific approach were used in the
short term. It’s evident that the market is not perfect; collusion may exist in
auctions and profits of RPS may be higher than expected. In addition, if the
extra-profit of FIT is invested in R&D of RES-E, it could be easily justified
by policymakers. However, considering the assumptions and the results of
this paper, I suggest a mix of technology-neutral and technology-specific
policies using RPS or auction mechanisms to promote RES-E in both short
and long term. Technology-neutral policies would be for RES-E technologies in the deployment stage with equivalent LCC, and technology-specific
policies would be designed for emerging technologies with higher LCC
costs and low cumulative production.
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